

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

TO

Chief, EE

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, Austria

SUBJECT **D** DIZTAG/GRENGULF/GRCAMERA/  
GRENGULF-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK  
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

MICROFILMED

SEP 19 1963

DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. For the record, we wish to note that the GRENGULF/7 case has leaked to at least one Vienna newspaper. This was inevitable, considering the ever-increasing number of people who have gained knowledge of the case.

2. The circumstances in which we became aware of press knowledge of the case have been recorded in the attached contact report.

3. While we think that we have blocked publication in GRCAMERA's newspaper, it cannot be assumed that the source of the leak has restricted his indiscretion to GRCAMERA's correspondent or that there is or will be only one source of leak. On the contrary, judging by previous precedents and the generally insufficient regard for security in Austrian Government circles, we can anticipate that in due course the GRENGULF/7 incident will become a matter of general knowledge and that, sooner or later, possibly depending on internal political considerations, some newspaper will print the story for its embarrassment potential.

4. Enough people now know about the GRENGULF/7 case in the Austrian Government to make any guessing about the source(s) of the information given to GRCAMERA and possible future leaks a fruitless enterprise.

Attachment:

Contact Report

Distribution:

2-Chief, EE w/att

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

1 Encl.

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

EAVA-32297

13 September 1963

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Secret

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SEP 19 1963

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ATTACHMENT TO EAVA-32297

CONTACT REPORT

1. At lunch on 6 September with GRCAMERA he asked me to comment on the following:

According to his sources in the Interior Ministry, the Americans have provided unquestionable information to the effect that a senior employee of the Interior Ministry, formerly the right-hand man of Pammer, was an agent of the Soviets. Although the Minister is satisfied about the authenticity of the information, the man remains on the payroll of the Interior Ministry because the Americans are not willing to put their information on the suspect in such a form that it would be acceptable for the purposes of criminal prosecution.

2. I told GRCAMERA that I continue to be impressed with his sources in the police even though his statement contains certain inaccuracies. I said that I was sure the same sources which provided the above would also be in a position to correct the inaccuracies which were not of such nature as to effect the basic problems posed by the case.

3. Subsequently I gave him the party line on better training and salaries for personnel concerned with security matters, the concepts of defensive security investigations, the possibilities of the polygraph in screening candidates for certain positions, etc. I also described to him in theoretical terms the problems faced by an intelligence agency when it tries to play prosecutor, and the danger of compromise to intelligence sources and methodology when the accused is given access by the court to precisely that type of information which he is in fact most eager to get. GRCAMERA said he understood and of course would not print anything on this subject.

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